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COMMENT
JOHN HANCOCK v. HARRIS TRUST:
SHOULD INSURERS' GENERAL ACCOUNTS
BE SUBJECT TO ERISA?
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA")1 constituted a fundamental change in the regulation of
pension plans.2 When Congress enacted ERISA, it was concerned
primarily with providing for adequate funding of pension plans,
providing employees with plan information, and protecting the as-
sets allocated to fund pension obligations. 3 To protect plan assets,
1 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
2 Prior to ERISA, government regulation of private pensions was limited to curb-
ing specific abuses. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-67, 171-83, 185-87, 557 (1947)) (re-
quiring management and labor trustees to administer union-sponsored plans and es-
tablishing criminal penalties for abuses); Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act,
72 Stat. 997 (1958) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1958)) (requiring
limited disclosure of pension plan information), repealed by § 111(a)(1), 88 Stat. 829,
851 (1974). ERISA, by contrast, is a broad statute providing guidelines for the estab-
lishment, operation, and administration of private employers' welfare and pension
plans. See BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON EMPLOYEE RE=rzir INcoME SECURTY
ACT 1 (2d ed. 1987); Anthony A. Harris, Introduction to ERISA. SELECTED LEGIsLA-
HrvE sTORY 1974-1986 v (1986) ("The enactment of the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act marked the beginning of a broadened federal interest in liberaliz-
ing and expanding private pension plans. .. ").
3 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988). The statute's policy declaration observes that
"the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents
are directly affected by [employee benefit] plans" and declares it "desirable in the in-
terests of employees and their beneficiaries... that disclosure be made and safe-
guards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration
of such plans." Id. The statute further states that because the standards in effect
prior to ERISA were inadequate, "the soundness and stability of plans with respect to
adequate funds to pay promised benefits may [have been] endangered" at the time of
ERISA's enactment. Id.; see also COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 3. "ERISA has several
major objectives: to ensure that workers and beneficiaries receive adequate informa-
tion about their employee benefit plans; [tlo set standards of conduct for those manag-
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Congress included provisions that governed the behavior of fiduci-
aries4-those responsible for the administration of pension plans
and their assets.'
In 1993, pension plan group annuity contracts accounted for
approximately $330 billion of insurance companies' general ac-
counts. 6 Based on ERISA section 401(b)(2)7 and the Department
of Labor's ("DOL") Interpretive Bulletin 75-2,1 the insurance in-
ing employee benefit plans and plan funds; [and] [tlo determine that adequate funds
are being set aside to pay promised pension benefits. . . ." Id.
4 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988). This section broadly defines a fiduciary:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management
of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other
compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other prop-
erty of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he
has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the admin-
istration of such plan.
Id.
5 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988). With respect to benefit plans, ERISA requires
that fiduciaries act "solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries," id.,
and with "care, skill, prudence, and diligence." Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B). In addition, fiducia-
ries must diversify the plan's investments "to minimize the risk of large losses." Id.
§ 1104(a)(1)(C). Section 1106 specifically prohibits a fiduciary from "deal[ing] with the
assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own account." Id. § 1106(b)(1); see
Evans v. Bexley, 750 F.2d 1498, 1500 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding fiduciary may serve as
trustee of two employee benefit plans "so long as nothing in the arrangement causes
him to violate the general fiduciary duties codified in ERISA"); DANIEL C. KNICKER-
BOCKER, JR., FIDUCIARY RESPONSMILrrY UNDER ERISA § 1.03 (1994) (noting promi-
nence of ERISA's rules designed to assure proper plan management by establishing
broad fiduciary rules).
6 See Supreme Court Explains When Assets of an Insurance Company's General
Account are Plan Assets, 2 ERISA Litig. Rep. (P-H) No. 6, at 3 (Dec. 1993) (describing
current importance of group annuity contract assets), available in WESTLAW,
Pen-tp database.
7 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2) (1988). "In the case of a plan to which a guaranteed bene-
fit policy is issued by an insurer, the assets of such plan shall be deemed to include
such policy, but shall not... be deemed to include any assets of such insurer." Id.
8 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-2 (1992). The DOL stated that the proceeds from a guaran-
teed investment contract or an insurance policy, sold to an employee benefit plan
which is placed in an insurance company's general account, would not convert the
account's assets into "plan assets." Id.; see Stephen H. Goldberg & Melvin S. Altman,
The Case for the Nonapplication of ERISA to Insurers' General Account Assets, 21
TORT & INS. L.J. 475, 485-86 (1986). Prior to the issuance of Interpretive Bulletin 75-
2, then Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor Management Relations Paul J. Fasser,
Jr. explained to Congress that the purpose of Interpretive Bulletin 75-2 was to ensure
that "managers are ... not restricted from engaging in normal business transactions,
including transactions with persons who happen to be parties in interest with respect
to the policyholder plans." Id. at 486 (citation omitted). Immediately after the publica-
tion of Interpretive Bulletin 75-2, the DOL issued Advisory Opinion 75-79, which re-
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dustry has relied on the assumption that ERISA's fiduciary duties
do not apply to the management of general account assets, be-
cause they are not "plan assets,"9 and has conducted its affairs
accordingly. 10 Recently, in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank," the United States Supreme
Court ruled that "free funds"12 of a guaranteed annuity contract
are "plan assets,"'3 and therefore, an insurance company's "ac-
tions in regard to their management and disposition must be
judged against ERISA's fiduciary standards."' 4
This Comment analyzes the way the Court's holding "under-
mines the fundamental premises on which billions of dollars of in-
surance contracts" have been sold to retirement plans by the in-
surance industry. 15 Part I explains how the Supreme Court
affirmed that an insurer's general account funds were not "plan assets" with respect
to general account group annuity contracts. Fiduciary Duties Under ERISA, Dol.
Adv. Op. 75-79 (Feb. 1, 1975), 1975 ERISA LEXIS 85. Therefore, a transaction be-
tween a party in interest and an insurance company will not be prohibited solely be-
cause of a contract for life insurance or annuity between the parties. KNICKERBOCKER,
supra note 5, § 2.05.
9 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (defining fiduciary as one with "authority or control
respecting... [plan] assets").
10 See Jonathan M. Ocker et al., Executive Compensation: A 1987 Road Map For
The Corporate Advisor, 43 Bus. LAw. 185, 243 (1987) (advising corporate attorneys
that based on advisory opinions insurance policies will not constitute plan assets);
Goldberg & Altman, supra note 8, at 486 (noting insurance industry has conducted its
affairs under impression that general account assets are not "plan assets" and manag-
ers of such assets are not "fiduciaries within the meaning of ERISA"). In addition,
cases have held that the insurer is not subject to fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Trustees of
Laborers' Local No. 72 Pension Fund v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 783 F. Supp. 899,
906 (D.N.J. 1992) (granting partial summary judgment because funds deposited in
general account were not plan assets).
11 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993).
12 The Court adopted the parties' definition of "free funds" as an amount of pen-
sion funds greater than "105 percent of the amount needed to provide guaranteed
benefits." Id. at 522.
13 See 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2) (exempting from insurer's plan assets any guaran-
teed benefit policy). The Court, while noting this exemption, found that the free funds
provided no guaranteed benefit. Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at 527-29.
14 Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at 529.
15 See Scott V. Rozmus, Note, Insurers Beware: General Account Activities May
Subject Insurance Companies to ERISA's Fiduciary Obligations, 88 Nw. U. L. REv.
803, 803 (1994) (noting that investment acumen of large insurance companies draws
billions of dollars into group annuity contracts, which are then pooled in insurers'
general accounts); Brief of the State of New York and the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993) (No. 92-1074), available in LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Briefs fie, [hereinafter Amici Brief] (expressing view that Congress
did not intend general account assets of insurance companies to be considered "plan
assets" under ERISA).
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arrived at its decision. Part II briefly explains the way an insur-
ance company's general account works. Part III discusses
ERISA's fiduciary duties and analyzes their effect on insurers'
general accounts. Part IV discusses ERISA's prohibited transac-
tion provisions and their effect on insurers' general accounts in
light of the Supreme Court's decision. Part V discusses insurers'
course of action in light of this decision. This Comment concludes
that the Supreme Court has gone too far in applying ERISA to
insurers' general accounts, and that it is Congress's responsibility
to correct this judicial overstep.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF HACOCK AND THE SUPREME
CouRT's DECISION
In Hancock, the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany ("Hancock") entered into a contract known as a "deposit ad-
ministration contract"16 or "participating group annuity"'7 with
the Harris Trust and Savings Bank ("Harris"), a retirement plan
trustee for the Sperry Rand Corporation. Pursuant to their agree-
ment, Hancock received premiums from Sperry's retirement plan
which it deposited in its general account and later used to
16 See Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 322
(7th Cir. 1983). Peoria defined a "group deposit administration contract" as one in
which:
The insurance company determines what the employer must contribute an-
nually to fund the plan; the contributions are deposited with the insurance
company, which invests them as a single account rather than setting up a
separate account for each employee; and the funds in the account are com-
mingled for investment purposes with the funds of other customers of the
insurance company, in much the same way as investments of different inves-
tors are pooled in a mutual fund or common trust fund, in order to obtain
diversification while minimizing brokerage and management costs. When an
employee retires, the insurance company informs the employer how much
the employee's retirement annuity will cost. The employer can purchase the
annuity from the insurance company with a portion of the funds on deposit
or it can withdraw funds and purchase the annuity from another insurance
company.
Id.; see also, 2 JEFFREY D. MZmoRsKy, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAw ERISA AND BEYOND
§ 8.03[3][b] (1994) (noting that insurance company guarantees benefits to extent pre-
miums are paid); Goldberg & Altman, supra note 8, at 479-80.
17 See MAmoRsKY, supra note 16, § 8.03[3][a] (defining "group annuity plan" as
one in which "[bienefits under the plan are funded through an arrangement governed
by a contract between the insurance company and the employer. The employer buys
deferred annuities that will pay the planned retirement benefit, usually commencing
at normal retirement age.").
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purchase annuities to secure retiree benefits.1 8  Harris argued
that in managing its general account, Hancock was actually man-
aging "plan assets" and was therefore subject to the fiduciary du-
ties under ERISA.19 Hancock contended that it had no fiduciary
responsibility for the management of its general account because
the contract fit within ERISA's "guaranteed benefit policy" exclu-
sion.20 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 21 to resolve a split
among the circuits on whether the guaranteed benefit policy ex-
clusion applied to this type of annuity contract.22
18 114 S. Ct. at 522. The Court noted that Hancock's general account was also
used to pay its business costs and obligations to insureds and creditors. Id.
19 Id. at 523. Harris further contended that Hancock breached its fiduciary duties
because it did not allow Harris access to "free funds." Id.
20 Id. A "guaranteed benefit policy" is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2)(B) (1988)
as an insurance policy or contract "to the extent that such policy or contract provides
for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed by the insurer. Such term includes
any surplus in a separate account, but excludes any other portion of a separate ac-
count." 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2) (1988) provides that insurer's fimds are not plan assets
solely because of a "guaranteed benefit policy." See supra note 7.
21 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 1576
(1993).
22 See Mack Boring & Parts v. Meeker Sharkey Moffitt, 930 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.
1991). In Mack Boring, the Third Circuit held that for a general account contract to fit
under the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion, it is enough that it provides for "guar-
anteed benefits to plan participants at some finite point in the future." Id. at 273. This
is so even if the amount credited to the pension administration fund fluctuates accord-
ing to the performance of the general account before the contract funds are converted
to fixed annuities (the "payment phase"). Id. Similarly, in Associates in Adolescent
Psychiatry, S.C. v. Home Life Ins. Co., 941 F.2d 561, 568-69 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1182 (1992), the Seventh Circuit held that an insurance company
was not a fiduciary with respect to a "flexible annuity contract" because "it set fixed
annual rates" and "backed its promise with its full assets." The court concluded that
the "flexible annuity contract" was a "guaranteed benefit policy" that entitled the in-
surer to a § 1101(b)(2) exemption. Id. Conversely, in Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. v.
Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 327 (7th Cir. 1983), the Seventh Circuit held
that a deposit administration contract was not a "guaranteed benefit policy" within
the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2) with respect to the accumulation phase of the
contract. Splitting the deposit administration contract into an accumulation phase
and an annuity payment phase, the court decided that during the accumulation
phase, amounts contributed to the account are subject to the insurance company's
investment discretion with only a "modest income guaranty." Id. The court found the
insurance company to be a fiduciary with respect to the investment return on the
policy. Id. In Jacobson v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 655 F. Supp. 1290 (D.
Conn.), vacated, 662 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Conn. 1987), the district court followed the
Peoria rationale. In granting summary judgment, the court held that if it is possible
for a plan's funds to fluctuate because of the insurer's investment performance, the
insurer will be a fiduciary until the funds are converted into a "fixed obligation or
guarantee which then provide[s] sufficient protection for the benefits." Id. at 1130; see
Rozmus, supra note 15, at 808-18 (discussing judicial analysis of pension contracts
and guaranteed benefit policy exclusion); Aleta Spence, The Harris Trust Case, in
1994]
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The litigants referred to the contract in dispute as Group An-
nuity Contract No. 50 ("GAC 50").23 For bookkeeping purposes,
GAC 50 contained two accounts.24 Its assets were recorded in the
"Pension Administration Fund" ("PAF") and its liabilities in the
"Liabilities of the Fund" ("LOF"). 2 5 Hancock commingled premi-
ums from GAC 50 with its general account, out of which Hancock
paid its operating costs and satisfied its obligations.26 Funds from
the PAF were converted into retirement benefits when the plan
administrator notified Hancock that a retiree was entitled to re-
ceive benefits. At that time Hancock would guarantee payment
of the retiree's benefits and would credit the corresponding liabil-
ity to the LOF. 2' The litigation centered around the control of
GAC 50's "free funds," the amount by which the PAF exceeded the
"Minimum Operating Level" (the LOF plus a five percent contin-
gency cushion).29 "Free funds" increased dramatically between
PENSION PLAN INvEsTmENTs 1994: Co roNTING TODAY'S LEGAL IssuEs, at 203, 204
(PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. 353, 1994) (discuss-
ing split among circuits).
23 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517,
521 (1993).
24 Id. at 522. This bookkeeping provision was included in the contract between
Hancock and Harris; however, the actual funds were not segregated. Id.
25 Id. The Court noted that these recording procedures were included when the
litigation commenced although the contract had been amended many times since its
inception in 1941. Id. GAC 50 provided that the PAF maintained by Hancock was to
be adjusted by a pro rata share of the general account's investment gains and losses.
Id.
26 Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at 521.
27 Id.
28 Id. In the event that the liabilities (the LOF plus a five percent contingency
cushion) ever exceeded the accumulated funds (PAF), GAC 50 provided that the "ac-
tive" or "accumulation" phase of the contract would automatically terminate, and the
contract would convert back to a simple deferred annuity contract. Id. If this oc-
curred, Hancock would be required to cover all benefits that GAC 50 previously guar-
anteed by purchasing annuities at specified rates stated in the contract. Id.
29 See supra note 12 (defining "free funds"). In 1977, Harris was granted the right
to request that Hancock pay "non-guaranteed benefits" to retirees out of the "free
funds." Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at 522. These benefits were deemed "non-guaranteed"
because they were only payable out of the "free funds," and "free funds" only existed
when the PAF exceeded the LOF plus the five percent contingency cushion. Id. In
May 1982, Hancock terminated Harris' right to request "non-guaranteed benefits." Id.
The only way that Harris could then access GAC 50's "free funds" was by demanding
the transfer of the entire amount of "free funds" from the PAF. Id. at 523. This would
have required an asset liquidation adjustment, which Harris believed would have un-
dervalued the retirement plan's share of Hancock's general account. Id. Harris,
therefore, would not request such a transfer and was effectively estopped from con-
trolling the plan's "free funds." Id.
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1982 and 1988, prompting Harris to seek greater control of these
increased assets and eventually resulting in litigation. °
In July 1983, Harris filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York,3 claiming that
"Hancock breached its fiduciary obligations under ERISA by deny-
ing Harris any realistic means to make use of GAC 50's free
funds."32 Hancock relied on ERISA's exemption for assets of an
insurer that provides a guaranteed benefit policy, and argued that
ERISA's fiduciary duties did not apply to it because the benefits of
GAC 50 were "guaranteed by the insurer."33
The district court granted Hancock's motion for summary
judgment in September 1989. 34 The court held that GAC 50 was a
"guaranteed benefit policy" in its entirety and, therefore, Hancock
was not an ERISA fiduciary.35 The Second Circuit, reversing in
part, concluded that Hancock was a fiduciary under ERISA with
respect to the "free funds" used to pay nonguaranteed benefits. 6
30 Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at 523. "Free funds" increased during this time because of
the positive investments made by Harris. These gains increased the value of the en-
tire general account and were partly credited to the PAF. Id. In addition, a lack of
guaranteed benefit payments out of the LOF further increased the difference between
the LOF and PAF. Id.
31 Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F. Supp. 998
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), reu'd, 970 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993).
32 114 S. Ct. at 521 (basing fiduciary duty on theory that Hancock was managing
"plan assets").
33 Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2)(B) (1988); supra note 7; infra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text (defining "guaranteed benefit policy").
34 Harris Trust, 722 F. Supp. at 998.
35 Id. at 1020. The district court relied heavily on ERISA's legislative history and
the DOL's regulations and interpretations. Id. at 1017-20. The court concluded that
under GAC 50 the covered employees received a fixed amount as provided by the
plan's terms which did not depend on fluctuations in Hancock's general account. Id. at
1015-16. Hancock was obligated to pay covered employees the amounts to which they
were entitled, even if Hancock's general account experienced losses. Id. Thus, GAC
50's insurance risks were placed "on the insurer, not on the plan's covered employees."
Id. at 1015.
36 Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 1138,
1143 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993). The court of appeals determined that,
although a portion of the benefits was guaranteed, the benefits stemming from the
"free funds" fluctuated with investment performance and, therefore, were not guaran-
teed. Id. at 1143-45. In support of its position, the court looked to ERISA's legislative
history which stated that "[i]f the policy guarantees basic payments but other pay-
ments may vary with, e.g., investment performance, then the variable part of the pol-
icy and assets attributable thereto are not to be considered as guaranteed, and are to
be considered as plan assets subject to the fiduciary rules." Id. at 1143 (citing H.R.
REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 296 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038,
5077).
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The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit holding that Han-
cock was an ERISA fiduciary because the "free funds" of GAC 50
were "plan assets. 37
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg stated that each com-
ponent of an annuity contract must be analyzed to determine
whether it fits within the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion.3
The Court found that certain characteristics must be present for a
contract's free funds to qualify for the exclusion.3 9 The two crucial
elements in this analysis are "the insurer's guarantee of a reason-
able rate of return on those funds" and "a mechanism to convert
the funds into guaranteed benefits at rates set by the contract."40
The Court determined that GAC 50's free funds did not satisfy
these requirements, and therefore John Hancock was a fiduciary
with respect to the free funds.4 1
In a dissenting opinion,42 Justice Thomas argued that the
Court's decision "abruptly overturns the settled expectations of
the insurance industry by deeming a substantial portion of [a con-
tract's free] funds 'plan assets' and thus subjecting insurers to the
fiduciary regime of [ERISA]."43
37 Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at 529.
38 Id. The Court noted that a component fits within the exclusion "only if it allo-
cates investment risk to the insurer." Id.; see infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text
(defining "guaranteed benefit policy").
39 Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at 529. The Court suggested that without these elements,
plan participants bear the risk that future benefits 'attributable to the free funds...
[will] fall to zero." Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. Although GAC 50 contained a semblance of these elements, the Court found
it insufficient to meet the statutory exemption. Id.
42 Id. at 531-38 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas agreed with the major-
ity's contention that the guaranteed benefit policy exception found in § 401(b)(2) of
ERISA does not "exclude all general account assets from ERISA's coverage." Id. at
532. Justice Thomas disagreed, however, with the majority's "making the exception
depend upon whether investment risk is allocated to the insurer." Id. He stated that
the Court's new test "bears little relation" to the statute as enacted by Congress. Id.
43 Id. at 532 (Thomas, J., dissenting) The DOL has taken the position that gen-
eral account assets are not "plan assets." Id. at 535 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-2
(1992)). Justice Thomas argued that insurers have relied on the DOL's position and
have managed general account assets "not in accordance with ERISA's fiduciary obli-
gations, but in accordance with potentially incompatible state law rules." Id. at 535.
Justice Thomas deemed the relevant question under the statute to be "not whether
the contract shifts investment risk, but whether, and to what extent, it 'provides
for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed.'" Id. at 532 (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b)(2)(B)). In his view, a contract could "provide for" guaranteed benefits before
the funds are actually converted and the investment risk is shifted to the insurer. Id.
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II. INSURANCE COMPANIEs' GENERAL AccoUNTs
Insurance companies, like banks, are one of the largest hold-
ers of private pension plan assets.44 Unlike banks, which ordina-
rily hold plan assets in separate trusts, insurance companies sell
annuity contracts to employers or plan sponsors.45 This type of
contract provides guaranteed benefits and other security to retir-
ees.46 The premiums received from annuities are deposited in the
insurer's general account, which contains all of the insurance com-
pany's assets.47 Because of this commingling of assets, it is impos-
sible to determine which of those assets in the general account are
allotted to specific contractholders.
48
44 Goldberg & Altman, supra note 8, at 478. "General account assets are often
invested by the insurance company in private placement loans, corporate bonds, mort-
gages, real estate and many other investment vehicles." Trustees of Laborers' Local
No. 72 Pension Fund v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 783 F. Supp. 899, 905 n.10 (D.N.J.
1992) (citation omitted).
45 Pension plan sponsors favor annuity contracts because they meet the needs of
small and medium sized employers who lack the resources required to create and
maintain a pension plan. See Gary M. Ford, Recent Controversies Involving the
Purchase of Irrevocable Annuities and Insurance Company Insolvencies, 793 ALI-ABA
143, 149 (1993). Without these annuity contracts, many employers would be unable
to offer their employees a pension plan. Id. "As originally enacted, ERISA did not
specify the means by which the administrator should distribute benefits to partici-
pants upon plan termination." Id. at 158. Nevertheless, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation regulations "generally require the plan administrator to satisfy benefit
obligations through purchasing annuities from an insurance carrier." Id. (citing 29
C.F.R. § 2615 (1981) (recodified at 29 C.F.R. § 2617 (1981))).
46 Goldberg & Altman, supra note 8, at 478-79; see S.S. HUEBNER & KENNETH
BLACK, JR., LIFE INSURANCE 434 (9th ed. 1976). Life insurance companies offer "con-
siderable flexibility" in tailoring individual contracts to meet individual employer
needs. Id. Because life insurance companies are in the business of accepting risks,
they are willing to underwrite the risks associated with pension plans. Id.
47 Goldberg & Altman, supra note 8, at 479. Included in the general account are
premiums from the insurer's life, accident and health insurance policies and premi-
ums from plans that ERISA covers. Id. The result of this commingling is that the
premiums received from annuities are "available to satisfy all of the insurer's obliga-
tions to all of its contractholders and other creditors." Id.; see also DAN M. McGILL &
DONALD GRUBBS, JR., FUNDAmENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 492 (6th ed. 1989) (ex-
plaining that only funds available to insurance company for routine business ex-
penses, such as rent, are in general account).
48 See Goldberg & Altman, supra note 8, at 479; see also Brief for Petitioner Har-
ris Trust & Sav. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir.
1992) (No. 92-1074), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File, (arguing that
there are no specific identifiable assets referable to any particular policy).
1994]
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III. FIDUCIARY DuTmis UNDER ERISA AND THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR INSURERS
Section 1002 of ERISA states that a fiduciary of an employee
benefit plan is one who "exercises any discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exer-
cises any authority or control respecting management or disposi-
tion of its assets."49 The "assets" of a plan, however, are undefined
except by exclusion in section 401. This section reads in part:
In the case of a plan to which a guaranteed benefit policy is is-
sued by an insurer, the assets of such plan shall be deemed to
include such policy, but shall not, solely by reason of the issuance
of such policy, be deemed to include any assets of such insurer.50
49 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (1988). The entire definition of a fiduciary reads:
(A) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B) [which deals with
companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940], a person
is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discre-
tionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposi-
tion of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compen-
sation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of
such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration
of such plan.
Id.; see Fredrick C. Kneip, Plan Investments: Prohibited Transactions and Other Fidu-
ciary Problems, 40TH N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX 11-1, 11-2 (ERISA Supp.) (1982). Per-
sons and firms that perform any of the basic statutory functions such as exercising
discretionary authority over plan management or plan assets have been held to be
ERISA fiduciaries. Id.; see, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc. v. Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. Co., 713 F.2d 254, 260 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that power to amend insur-
ance contract made insurance company ERISA fiduciary because amendment effec-
tively determined type of plan investments and constituted exercising control of plan
assets); Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 327
(7th Cir. 1983) (turning plan assets over to insurance company to manage with full
investment discretion made insurance company ERISA fiduciary); see also Greenblatt
v. Prescription Plan Servs. Corp., 783 F. Supp. 814, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("One who
exercises actual control over disposition of assets is a fiduciary under ERISA; one who
engages in purely 'ministerial' fimctions is not."); cf Jacobson v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 662 F. Supp. 1103, 1110-11 (D. Conn. 1987) (purchase of insurance con-
tract from insurer will not cause insurer's assets to be treated as plan assets if con-
tract is guaranteed benefits policy under ERISA).
50 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2) (1988); see Bozeman v. Provident Nat'l Assurance Co.,
No. 90-2925-4, 1992 WL 328804, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. May 15, 1992) (explaining ERISA
does not contain definition for "plan assets," but nonetheless exempts from that cate-
gory certain assets of insurers associated with "guaranteed benefit policies"); see also
H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 296 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5077. The House Report provides in part:
An insurance company also is not considered to hold plan assets if a plan
purchases an insurance policy from it, to the extent that the policy provides
payments guaranteed by the company. If the policy guarantees basic pay-
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Section 401(b)(2)(B) defines a "guaranteed benefit policy" as
"an insurance policy or contract to the extent that such policy or
contract provides for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed
by the insurer."5 ' The policy includes any surplus held in a sepa-
rate account, but excludes any other portion of that account.2
The Supreme Court has narrowly construed the guaranteed bene-
fit policy exception by focusing on the phrase "to the extent."53
The Court bifurcated the GAC 50 into guaranteed and
nonguaranteed portions, and concluded that the exemption only
applies "to the extent" that guaranteed benefits are provided.5 '
As a fiduciary, a life insurance company is required under
ERISA to manage its general account assets "solely in the interest
of participants and beneficiaries" of employee benefit plan con-
tract holders and "for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits
to such participants and beneficiaries."55 ERISA's fiduciary re-
sponsibility provisions, however, are fundamentally incompatible
with the operation of an insurer's general account, which requires
the pooling of risks and the collective management of assets. 6
ments but other payments may vary with, e.g., investment performance,
then the variable part of the policy and assets attributable thereto are not to
be considered as guaranteed, and are to be considered as plan assets subject
to fiduciary rules.
Id.
51 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2)(B) (1988); see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517, 521 (stating that "guaranteed benefit pol-
icy" is statutory invention and not insurance industry trade term); Bozeman, 1992 WL
328804, at *6 ("In general the purpose of these provisions [i.e., defining 'plan assets'
and 'guaranteed benefit policy'] was to exempt from fiduciary status insurers who is-
sue standard insurance policies, including standard annuities.").
52 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2)(B) (1988) ("Such term includes any surplus in a separate
account, but excludes any other portion of a separate account.").
53 Id. The Hancock Court commented in a footnote that "the term 'guaranteed
benefit contract... has never been a part of the insurance industry lexicon.'" See
Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at 524 n.4 (citation omitted). The Court concluded that "ERISA
itself must thus supply the terms meaning." Id.
54 Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at 524, 527. The Court suggested that the entire contract
was not "guaranteed" merely because the free funds could be used in the future to
purchase additional guaranteed benefits. Id. at 528. Contra Mack Boring & Parts v.
Meeker Sharkey Moffitt, 930 F.2d 267, 273 (3rd Cir. 1991) (indicating statutes' use of
"provides for" language does not require that benefits contracted for be delivered im-
mediately; it is enough that contract provides for guaranteed benefits "at some finite
point in the future").
55 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988). The Court in Hancock noted that "[t]o help fulfill
ERISA's broadly protective purposes, Congress commodiously imposed fiduciary stan-
dards on persons whose actions affect the amount of benefits retirement plan partici-
pants will receive." 114 S. Ct. at 524 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
56 See Amici Brief, supra note 15, at 6-7. The Amici Brief argued that:
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These requirements are also in conflict with state insurance laws,
which require that risks be spread "fairly and equitably" among
policyholders.5 7
Because an insurer's general account is its operating account
and is not segregated in any way, the general account cannot be
managed for the "exclusive benefit" of anyone. 8 Applying
ERISA's exclusive benefit rule would therefore divide an insurer's
loyalties, a situation that ERISA was "expressly designed to
prevent."59
Plans that choose to purchase general account contracts do so with the
full understanding that their payments to the insurer will become part of the
insurer's general corporate assets and will not be managed solely in their
interest or applied exclusively for their benefit. Indeed they generally draw
comfort from the fact that the contractual rights which they have acquired in
exchange for such consideration will be supported on an unsegregated basis
by a large pool of assets derived from various classes of business.
Id.
57 Stephen H. Goldberg, The Application of ERISA's Fiduciary Responsibility Pro-
visions to the Management of General Account Assets and General Account Contracts,
783 ALI-ABA 19, 22 (1992); see N.Y. INs. LAw § 4224 (McKinney 1994) (prohibiting
discrimination among contract holders); see also Amici Brief, supra note 15, at 8,
which noted that:
The interests of employee benefit plans and other general account con-
tractholders are protected by state insurance laws. These laws are designed
to assure that all contractholders are treated equitably and on a non-dis-
criminatory basis, and that an insurer is able to satisfy its contractual obli-
gation to all contractholders.
Id. The Supreme Court, however, has opined that the traditional preemption doctrine
calls for the supremacy of federal law when a state law impedes congressional objec-
tives. Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at 526. The Court reasoned that ERISA in general, and the
guaranteed benefit policy exception in particular, relate to insurance. Id. at 525
(quoting from United States Brief as Amicus Curiae).
58 See, e.g., Mack Boring & Parts v. Meeker Sharkey Moffitt, 930 F.2d 267, 268
(3d Cir. 1991). In Mack Boring, the court noted that the company's general account
included "all the assets and liabilities of its insurance and ancillary operations, except
those assets and liabilities specifically allocated to separate accounts." Id. The court
also observed that "[gleneral account assets are often invested by the insurance com-
pany in private placement loans, corporate bonds, mortgages, real estate, and many
other investment vehicles." Id.
59 Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 968 (2d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted); accord Mack
Boring, 930 F. 2d at 275 n.17 ("[I]f Congress had intended so severe a disruption of
insurance practices, practices that had been in existence for almost three decades
before the enactment of ERISA, it would have made its intention perfectly clear."); see
also Goldberg, supra note 57, at 40 (emphasizing that one should consider whether
Congress intended to make general account management under ERISA incompatible
with state insurance laws and responsibilities to policyholders other than those that
ERISA covers); cf Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341, 349 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (noting
that ERISA was designed to protect plan participants and beneficiaries with fiduciary
standards and remedies for breach).
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IV. PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS AND GENERAL AccouNTs
The Court's decision will also significantly disrupt insurers'
transactions with companies whose pension plans they fund.60
Furthermore, the Court's interpretation of section 401(b)(2) will
not only impose general fiduciary duties on insurers, but will also
restrict prohibited transactions. 6 '
ERISA's prohibited transactions rules apply to transactions
between a plan and a party in interest62 and transactions that in-
volve fiduciary self-dealing.63 Under ERISA, a party in interest
includes fiduciaries and employees of benefit plans, persons pro-
viding services to these plans, and employers whose employees are
covered by a plan.64 A fiduciary may not sell or lease property,
lend money, furnish goods or services, or transfer any plan assets,
either directly or indirectly, to a party in interest.65 These
prohibitions were designed to protect fiduciaries of plan assets
from undue influence by a party in interest.66
60 Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at 536 (Thomas, J., dissenting). ERISA expressly prohibits
fiduciaries from engaging in any transaction directly or indirectly between the plan
and a party in interest. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a).
61 See 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (prohibiting certain transactions between plan and party
in interest and fiduciary).
62 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (1988).
63 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (1988).
64 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (listing those entities considered to be parties in inter-
est). The statute lists among those considered to be a party in interest "any fiduciary
(including, but not limited to, any administrator, officer, trustee, or custodian), coun-
sel, or employee of such employee benefit plan." Id. § 1002(14)(A).
65 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1). This section provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in section 1108 of this title:
(1) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to engage
in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction
constitutes a direct or indirect-
(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property between the plan
and a party in interest;
(B) lending of money or other extension of credit between the plan
and a party in interest;
(C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a
party in interest;
(D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of a party in interest, of
any assets of the plan; or
(E) acquisition, on behalf of the plan, of any employer security or
employer real property in violation of section 1107(a) of this
title.
Id.
66 Kneip, supra note 49, at 11-1, 11-8. The party in interest prohibitions were
"created to prevent individuals close to benefit plans from exerting an undue influence
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The statutory prohibitions against fiduciary self-dealing dic-
tate that plan assets may not be used to benefit a fiduciary; that a
fiduciary must not act for a party adverse to the plan or its benefi-
ciaries in any plan-related transaction; and that a fiduciary may
not accept personal compensation for a transaction with the
plan.6 7 These prohibitions follow the common-law duties of loy-
alty and exclusive benefit.6 They protect a fiduciary from dual
loyalties, which would prevent it from acting exclusively for the
benefit of the plan's participants or beneficiaries. 9
The definitions of a "party in interest" and "prohibited trans-
actions" are so broad, however, that they might include persons
whose relationships to a plan are so attenuated that the fiduciary
may be unaware of its status as a party in interest. This may pre-
vent the fiduciary from protecting itself from liability for prohib-
ited transactions.7 °
The Supreme Court has effectively declared all assets in the
insurer's general accounts to be "plan assets."71  As a result,
many transactions that were previously considered unobjection-
on fiduciaries charged with the responsibility for the management of plan assets." Id.
at 11-8.
67 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b). This section provides in pertinent part:
A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not-
(1) deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own
account,
(2) in his individual or in any other capacity act in any transaction involving
the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests are ad-
verse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or benefi-
ciaries, or
(3) receive any consideration for his own personal account from any party
dealing with such plan in connection with a transaction involving the assets
of the plan.
Id.
68 See Kneip, supra note 49, at 11-8.
69 See Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341, 354 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (citing Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965)) (noting that fundamental purpose of ERISA is to insure
that fiduciaries do not act in situations in which their judgment might be affected).
70 See Kneip, supra note 49, at 11-6 to 11-7 (discussing prohibited transactions);
accord M & R Inv. Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 685 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
subsidiary of corporation to be party in interest to another subsidiary of corporation
though not participating in same employee benefit plan).
71 Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at 527 (holding that plan deposits put into insurance com-
pany's general account are not per se outside ERISA's fiduciary duties). The Court
stated that Congress's failure to pass a blanket exclusion for funds held in an in-
surer's general account indicates that there are times when such finds could be "plan
assets." Id. at 526-27; see 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101 (1993) (providing "[diefinition of
'plan assets'--plan investments").
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able are now proscribed. 72 An insurance company, for example,
will no longer be permitted to invest its premium receipts in bonds
or equity securities issued by any of the employers contributing to
the policyholder plan.73 Neither will the insurance company be
able to lease space to such employers in a building on which it
holds a mortgage.74 Additionally, it will not be permitted to
purchase any "goods, services or facilities from any one of those
employers.V5
The size and wide-ranging investment activities of general ac-
counts make it likely that insurance companies have invested in
securities of employers whose employees are covered by a plan.76
These investments are now prohibited under section 406(a), and
both fiduciaries and parties in interest may be subject to
liability.77
As previously noted, an insurance company that leases office
space may be in violation of section 401.78 If the lessor is a party
72 See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-2 (1993) (explaining how to determine whether party
in interest is engaged in prohibited transaction with employee benefit plan).
73 See Goldberg & Altman, supra note 8, at 485 (quoting Oversight on ERISA:
Hearings on Public Law 93-406 Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 390-91 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter Oversight on ERISA]) (describing why general account assets were not treated as
plan assets for purposes of fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA prior to
Hancock).
74 See Goldberg & Altman, supra note 8, at 485.
75 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (providing example of prohibited
transaction since general account assets are now treated as plan assets for purposes
of fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA); see also Supreme Court Expands
Reach of ERISA Fiduciary Provision to Group Annuity, Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA),
Dec. 14, 1993, available in WESTLAW, BNA-PBD database [hereinafter Supreme
Court Expands Reach]. The dissent in Hancock argued that the majority "abruptly
overturns the settled expectations of the insurance industry." Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at
532 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The holding could have a far-reaching effect: "[Liarge
insurance companies that may have sold policies to thousands of pension plans could
suddenly find themselves restricted in contracting with the corresponding thousands
of employers whose goods and services they may require." Id. at 536.
76 See 114 S. Ct. at 536.
77 See 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1988); Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at 529 ("[T]he free funds are
'plan assets,' and ... [Hancocls] disposition must be judged against ERISA's fiduci-
ary standards."). Fiduciaries will be subject to liability under ERISA section 409(a).
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1976). Parties in interest will be subject to an excise tax of five
percent of the amount involved in the prohibited transaction until the transaction is
corrected. Id.; see I.R.C. § 4975(a) (1988) (computing tax on prohibited transactions).
78 Goldberg & Altman, supra note 8, at 485. "Section 401(b) could be read to
mean that the insurance company... could not allow any [employers contributing to
the policyholder plan] to lease space in a building on which it held a mortgage ....
Id. (quoting Oversight on ERISA, supra note 73).
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in interest of a plan with assets in the insurer's general account,
the transaction would be prohibited.7 9 Insurance companies' con-
tracts for services may also be prohibited.8 ° If services, such as
cleaning or photocopying, are provided by a party in interest who
maintains a plan with assets in the insurer's general account, the
transaction will violate section 406.1
If an insurance company handled a small number of plans, it
would not be difficult to monitor whether lessees or providers of
goods and services were also employers who contributed to the
policyholder plan, thus allowing the insurance company to avoid
potential self-dealing situations.82 Larger carriers, however,
would find such recordkeeping impractical.8 3 In these instances,
not only would this recordkeeping be enormously difficult, if not
impossible, but the insurers would find themselves unable to
transact with thousands of employers whose goods or services
they need.8 4
Although ERISA's prohibited transactions are designed to
avoid conflicts of interest, the plan premiums in an insurance com-
pany's general asset account are only a small part of the ac-
count.8 5 The "general account" is the insurance company's general
corporate account, from which it pays all of its obligations to its
contractholders and its creditors, supports all of its business activ-
ities, and in the case of stock insurance companies, pays dividends
79 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A) (1988). "A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not
cause the plan to engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such trans-
action constitutes a direct or indirect ... leasing of ... any property between the plan
and a party in interest ... ." Id.
80 Id. § 1106 (a)(1)(C). Such a prohibition "may... significantly disrupt insurers'
transactions with companies whose pension plans they fund." Hancock, 114 S. Ct. at
536 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
81 114 S. Ct. at 536 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Goldberg & Altman, supra 8, at
845 (quoting Oversight on ERISA, supra note 73 (citicizing effects of majority holding
in Hancock)).
82 See Goldberg & Altman, supra note 8, at 485. "[T]hese restrictions might have
been manageable if the insurance company insured the benefits of only one or a few
plans, but some of the large carriers have sold policies to thousands of plans." Id.
(quoting Oversight on ERISA, supra note 73).
83 Goldberg & Altman, supra note 8, at 485 (quoting Oversight on ERISA, supra
note 73).
84 See Supreme Court Expands Reach, supra note 75. In Hancock, the plaintiff
argued "that the [Second Circuit] decision was contrary to the language and purpose
of ERISA and would be impossible to implement because the commingled general ac-
count assets are not identifiable with any particular contract." Id.
85 Goldberg & Altman, supra note 8, at 486 (citing Oversight on ERISA, supra
note 73).
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to its shareholders. 8  Therefore, "the risk of any one plan being
able to influence the investment policy of the insurance company
respecting the general asset account is extremely slight."8 7 The
application of ERISA's prohibited transactions regulations to an
insurer's general account impugns almost every transaction to
which the insurance company is a party-from leasing office space
and hiring a cleaning service to investing in securities.8 8
V. INSURANCE COMPANIES' COURSE OF ACTION
On March 25, 1994, the American Council of Life Insurance
("ACLI") fied a request with the DOL in the form of a class ex-
emption for retroactive relief from ERISA's prohibited transac-
tions.89 A class exemption would allow insurance companies to
engage in prohibited transactions without being subject to
ERISA'S rules and penalties.90 It would not, however, relieve in-
86 See Goldberg & Altman, supra note 8, at 476; Petitioners Brief at 5-6, John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993) (No. 92-
1074).
87 Goldberg & Altman, supra note 8, at 486 (quoting Oversight on ERISA, supra
note 73). "[Nlone of [the general account] assets is solely or directly attributable to
employee benefit plan contracts inasmuch as each asset stands behind all of the in-
surer's other obligations as well." Id. at 476; see Petitioner's Brief at 8, John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993) (No. 92-1074).
88 See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing prohibited transac-
tions); see also Petitioner's Brief at 14-15, John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris
Trust & Say. Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993) (No. 92-1074). Treating such transactions as
prohibited would be beyond the expectations of the insurance industry. Id. The DOL
"has never once stated that ERISA's fiduciary provisions are applicable to the General
Account practices of insurance companies and has never once sought to invoke those
provisions with regard to those practices." Id.
89 ACLI Seeks Retroactive Relief in Class Exemption Submitted to DOL, 21 Pens.
Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 660 (Mar. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Retroactive Relief]. ACLI,
which represents 90% of the nation's insurers, sought this unconditional relief retro-
active to January 1, 1975. Id. ACLI reasoned that Hancock "potentially calls into
question the normal operations of insurance company general accounts and the con-
tractual arrangements that have been relied upon to provide investment income and
benefit stability for employee benefit plans and their participants and beneficiaries."
Id. (citation omitted).
90 Id. (ruling could create large tax liability for insurance companies). Such a
ruling would force the DOL to choose the lesser of two evils. Id. The DOL cannot
abandon John Hancock at this juncture, after having openly supported them in this
dispute. Id. The DOL would "appear to be deserting the insurance company" if it
failed to grant a blanket exemption for insurance companies. Id. Conversely, the
DOL would be compromising its position as defender of pensioners' rights if it did
offer such an exemption. Id. "Such an exemption would also contradict the Clinton
administration's pro-participant stance." Id.
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surance companies of their fiduciary responsibilities.91 On April
15, 1994, the ACLI also requested an advisory opinion from the
DOL to reinforce the notion that insurance companies' ordinary
operations do not violate the fiduciary standards of ERISA.92
On August 22, 1994, the DOL issued a proposed exemption
that attempts to deal with some of the consequences of the
Supreme Court's decision.93 The exemption, however, only deals
with external transactions. For example, the proposed exemption
would provide relief for a transaction between a party in interest
and the insurer's general account, in which the plan's interest was
as a contractholder.94 This is subject, however, to a restriction
that limits any plan's interest in the insurer's general account to
ten percent. 95 The ten percent limitation applies to employer se-
curities or real property held by the general account. 6 Therefore,
the holding of employer securities and employer real property
through an insurer's general account is exempt from ERISA as
long as the ten percent test is met.
This proposed exemption does not address the internal activi-
ties of the general accounts, which could now be potentially
viewed as prohibited.9 7 For example, salaries of employees of the
insurer and provisions for office space and advertising expenses,
which could now be subject to ERISA because of the pooled nature
of general accounts, are not addressed.
If insurance companies fail to persuade the DOL and Con-
gress to completely overturn the ruling, they will likely be re-
91 John Hancock Decision Puts Insurers in Limbo, INs. REGULATOR, Feb. 7, 1994
at 1, available in LEXIS, Insurance Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Insurers in
Limbo] ("[The DOLl can't exempt fiduciary responsibility.... ."). Section 408 explicitly
states that the DOL may grant exemptions "from all or part of the restrictions im-
posed by sections 1106 and 1107(a)"; however, an exemption will not "relieve a fiduci-
ary from any other applicable provision of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a).
92 ACLI Requests DOL Advisory Opinion on "Customary" Practices of Insurers, 21
Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 813 (April 25, 1994) [hereinafter ACLI Requests DOL
Advisory Opinion]. The ACLI is not asking whether specific transactions violate
ERISA, rather, it seeks to verify that the "general account operating practices do not
inherently violate ERISA." Id.
93 59 Fed. Reg. 43,134 (1994).
94 Id. at 43,138.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See DOL Issues Proposed Class Exemption to Grant Insurers Relief from Rul-
ing, Pens & Ben. Daily (BNA), Aug. 22, 1994, available in WESTLAW, BNA-PBD
Database. The DOL has determined that it does not have sufficient information to
address these issues and is awaiting information from the American Council of Life
Insurance. Id.
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quired either to monitor returns separately on pension fund assets
held in their general accounts, or separate these funds from their
general account." Either of these options would increase record-
keeping and administrative costs, which in turn will raise transac-
tion costs for their pension fund clients and increase the cost of
annuities.99
CONCLUSION
The consequences of applying ERISA's fiduciary responsibil-
ity provisions to the management of general account assets and
contracts are far-reaching and create fundamental problems for
the insurance industry. ERISA requires a fiduciary to act "solely
in the interest of" and "for the exclusive purpose of" paying bene-
fits to employee plan participants and beneficiaries. This stan-
dard, however, is incompatible with an insurer's obligations to
policyholders, creditors, and shareholders who are not covered by
ERISA. The standard also conflicts with state insurance laws and
regulations that require insurers to administer general accounts
equitably for all policyholders. The application of ERISA's prohib-
ited transactions provisions could also disrupt billions of dollars in
investment activity in light of the numerous investment transac-
tions between employee benefit plan contractholders and parties
in interest that would be prohibited.
In rendering its decision, the Hancock Court did not consider
the practical effects of its ruling on the established expectations of
the insurance industry. Although the proposed exemption is a
step in the right direction, it does not go far enough. It is Con-
gress' responsibility to determine whether the benefits of applying
ERISA's fiduciary duties and prohibited transactions provisions to
insurer's general accounts outweigh the resulting costs to the in-
surance industry. The outcome is likely to increase the cost of an-
98 See ACLI Requests DOL Advisory Opinion, supra note 92, at 813 ("[mlnsurers
would no longer be able to offer products which have proven to be valuable for funding
employee benefits .... ."). Insurance companies previously represented that the money
they were investing from the general accounts was not ERISA plan money. See Insur-
ers in Limbo, supra note 91, at 1. Insurance companies affected by the decision, how-
ever, have either ceased to make such representations or attempted to segregate
tainted and safe assets in order to prevent their representations from being mislead-
ing. Id.
99 See, e.g., Insurers in Limbo, supra note 91, at 1. "[Transactions are prohibited
when.., any plan participant has a relation to another party involved in the deal.
This is a difficult requirement in an asset backed deal since there are so many parties
involved. . . ." Id.
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nuity contracts, which will ultimately operate to the detriment of
those whom ERISA is intended to protect.
Caroline J. Carucci*
* The author wishes to expressly recognize the assistance of Professor Susan J.
Stabile and the editorial board of the St. John's Law Review.
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